Summary
For the past four decades Indonesia has used its declining hydrocarbon exports to promote economic growth based on sound macroeconomic policy despite wasteful prestige projects and a dysfunctional state oil and gas company. Recently Indonesia's government has vigorously addressed poverty alleviation and human-resource development through conditional cash transfers by devoting budget resources freed up the reducing domestic fuel subsidies.
Despite corruption, Indonesia has been a -developmental state‖, avoiding the stagnation predicted by the -resource curse‖ argument. Indonesia's current and future risks and opportunities for channeling hydrocarbon wealth into poverty-alleviating programs through decentralized administration are analyzed through a -leakage model‖ of flows from the initial stages of arranging exploration and production to the final stages of administering the programs.
A. Introduction
Indonesia has been moderately endowed with natural resources, most notably hydrocarbons, hard minerals, and forests. The export revenues have sometimes been channeled constructively into sound development projects and social programmes, though with serious problems arising on occasion. This paper assesses the checkered experience with hydrocarbons.
After situating Indonesia's hydrocarbon wealth in comparison with that of other hydrocarbonexporting countries, the paper outlines the approaches and problems that have marked Indonesia's general experience with converting natural-resource wealth into development, especially in making social services available and accessible, and then focuses on the patterns specific to hydrocarbon revenues. Despite leakages in converting hydrocarbon revenues into social programmes, reforms underboth the Suharto administration and subsequently have been impressive. In addition, though institutions directly involved with hydrocarbon exploitation have been weak, Indonesia has long benefited from strong institutions in the central management of economic policy, finance, and planning.
Although the relative contribution of Indonesia's hydrocarbon resources to both GDP and exports has declined-a healthy development in reducing resource dependence -hydrocarbon revenues still constitute a very important part of government revenues that can be devoted to social programmes. Sound pricing policies and export-promotion efforts could significantly increase hydrocarbon export revenues. Because hydrocarbon rents belong to the state, royalties provide a much larger share of revenues than the small hydrocarbon share of exports would seem to imply. Oil and gas revenues contribute roughly a quarter of central government revenues (World Bank 2007b: 15) . Therefore the questions of how to maximize these revenues and channel them constructively are crucial for social programmes and human capital development. what policies are adopted or neglected because these revenues flow to the government, will shape the economic environment in which people earn income to enable them to purchase social services. Whether or not one prefers the privatization and marketization of social services, it is a reality in Southeast Asia and many other regions. For example, although the provision of hospital care is dominated by the government 1 , Ramesh (2002: 145-46) notes that less than onethird of health expenditures were covered by the public sector. He concludes that Indonesia, like Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, is remarkable in -the active role that governments play in providing but not financing health care.‖ Moreover, -the size of the public sector is shrinking whereas that of the private sector is correspondingly expanding… because of the ‗Unit Swadana'
(self-financing) policy the government has been following since 1991. The purpose of the policy is to decentralize the management of public hospitals and allow them greater autonomy with respect to raising revenues (including promoting private investment), staffing, and expenditure.‖ Ramesh (2002: 145) With respect to education, household surveys of the late 1990s revealed that school fees for primary education in Indonesia took up 17% of household income (Kattan and Burnett 2004: 14, 38) . 2 Low-income Indonesians pay part of the costs of sanitation, and, of course, food. Thus the conversion of hydrocarbon revenues into widely-shared income growth is highly relevant to the acquisition of social services. If poor governmental management of hydrocarbon exploitation leads to economic stagnation, then social-service access would be limited by this failure as well as by inadequate governmental programmes.
Second, governments may choose to make direct cash transfers to families so that they may purchase (among other things) social services, whether provided by private sources or the government. Figure 8 .1 depicts these paths from resource revenues to the access to social services.
Figure 8.1 Paths from Natural Resource Exploitation to Access to Social Services
2 See also King (1997) . More recent official estimates of parental contributions are: 4% for primary education, 13% for junior secondary, and 17% for senior secondary (World Bank 2007b: 36 This figure tries to capture the diversity of flows of financial resources and policy influences that natural resources generate. The value of resource assets that the national government does control are necessarily shared with the international companies. Yet they are also increasingly shared with sub-national governments directly through the contract terms (some provinces receive up to 15% of oil revenues [Arnold 2004 : 2]), and through fiscal decentralization, which in Indonesia has been much more important since the fall of the Suharto government. Fiscal decentralization has largely been accomplished through transfers from the central to the provincial governments, rather than by increasing sub-national taxing capacity. Therefore the The central and sub-national governments' programmes include the direct provision of social services (e.g., public schools and government hospitals). They also include the training of social-service providers (e.g., teachers and physicians). . Finally, government programmes can subsidize the purchase of social services (e.g., by transfers to schools or private hospitals that permit reductions in fees).
The -human capital development‖ premise is captured by the connection between the use of social services and the increase in productivity and therefore both household income and national economic growth. Insofar as additional social services are targeted to the poor, this connection would also contribute to greater income equity.
The diagram's dashed lines connecting resource revenues to macroeconomic policies and to spending other than direct cash transfers and governmental social service programmes indicate an influence, rather than a true flow. Resource revenues may motivate government officials to adopt particular macroeconomic policies-which may be positive or negative for economic growth and income distribution. Resource revenues can also influence overall spending strategies-for example, in financing money-losing prestige projects that impede economic growth. However, some government spending that does not go into social-service programmes can have a positive impact on economic growth if it is well allocated (e.g., on needed physical infrastructure).
Situating the Indonesian Case through Cross-national Comparisons. To avoid drawing faulty conclusions from cross-national comparisons, it is important to clarify Indonesia's status as a producer of hydrocarbons, and the degree of dependence on these resources. Indonesia has never been wealthy in per capita sub-soil assets compared to other nations. Indonesia has strong but largely still unrealized potential in exporting natural gas and coal. Most importantly, as a significant oil exporter, Indonesia had a significant budgetary dependence on oil revenues. Yet as a populous country which periodically heavily subsidized domestic fuel prices, Indonesia has lost its oil-exporting advantage, although this is potentially reversible if the recent unattractiveness to investment in exploration and production can be reversed.
This resource profile puts Indonesia in a strikingly similar situation to Mexico and Nigeria when declining domestic production levels intersect with rising domestic consumption.
These three countries are populous developing countries sharing similar policy histories and consequences: 1) large, vertically integrated state oil and gas companies, with retail monopolies;
2) requirements that international companies partner with the state companies; 3) serious problems of inefficiency and corruption of these companies; 4) disincentives for foreign investment to bolster oil production, due to government policies and political disruptions; 5) efforts to privatize the state oil and gas company, or at least reduce the centrality of the state company in E&P operations (taken much further in Indonesia than in Mexico or Nigeria); 6) periods of drastically low domestic fuel prices, countered by readjustment efforts (most successful in Mexico; least successful in Nigeria).
Indonesia and Mexico have also shared the policy of direct cash transfers to lowincome families as a response to difficult economic adjustments, and Indonesia has recently followed Mexico in using conditional cash transfers to steer people to health services, education, improved nutrition, etc. They have also shared efforts of fiscal decentralization.
Compared to these two countries, Indonesia is less subsoil-resource dependent in terms of government revenues. We shall see that the most balanced term to describe Indonesia's current situation is that it is subsoil-resource reliant rather than resource rich or resource dependent. Comparisons between Indonesian patterns and those of relatively low-population, high resource-asset countries like Chile, Norway, Saudi Arabia, or Venezuela could be quite misleading.
B. Indonesia's Mineral Wealth and Development
Indonesia has roughly 4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (28 th largest in the world), 3 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas reserves in 2010 (14th largest in the world and the largest in Asia-Pacific region) (Central Intelligence Agency 2011), and 5.5 billion metric tons of coal (the 14 th largest in the world) (World Energy Council 2010: 11)). Indonesia ranks 22nd in oil production, with an output of just over one million barrels per day. Yet with a population of over 220 million people, Indonesia does not enjoy the exportable surplus of many oil-producing developing countries. In 2010 Indonesia imported over 100 thousand barrels of oil per day (Tan 2010) , as demand increased and production fell. However, Indonesia could again be a net exporter in the future. Exploration has stalled for many years because of instability and difficulties of reaching agreements with the state oil and gas company Pertamina and the Indonesian government; contract disputes with international oil companies had stalled production from existing discoveries. Recent reforms have reduced these obstacles, as reviewed later. Also, the high world price of oil has already stimulated greater international interest in Indonesia (U.S.
Energy Information Administration 2007: 2). In terms of reducing consumption so that surplus oil could be exported, crucial pricing reforms to reduce fuel subsidies should have an impact on energy conservation, as could the current efforts to substitute natural gas and coal for oil.
However, rising world oil prices have made it difficult to make full and lasting inroads into eliminating the subsidies.
The outlook for other hydrocarbon coal exports is much more positive, in that natural gas exports have recently averaged US$10 billion annually, although low domestic prices limit the available supply for export (Bowden 2011) . Three-quarters of Indonesia's rapidly increasing coal production 229 million metric tons in 2008) is exported (World Energy Council2010, 16).
Chinese demand has already exceeded its domestic supply, raising the international price of coal and placing Indonesia in a very advantageous position because of its proximity to China. Thus, although the government has been trying to promote the domestic use of gas and coal to conserve petroleum, Indonesia has been earning US$16 billion in net gas and coal exports, and will continue to earn comparably high revenues in the future. The current situation of net imports reflects the prior failure to come to terms with international oil companies to explore and develop fields in time to take advantage of today's very favorable world oil prices. The privatization of the oil sector and the demotion of the role of Pertamina have the potential to reduce these failures, but this is uncertain.
C. General Patterns of Economic and Social Development
Economic Development. In many respects, Indonesia has enjoyed impressive economic growth over the past three decades. From 1981 to 2010, Indonesia's GDP grew at an annual rate of 5.8% in constant U.S dollars. The half-decade annual growth rates were: Indonesia has been famously the subject of -green accounting‖ efforts to adjust national accounts by taking into account the depletion of natural resources. Repetto et al. (1987 Repetto et al. ( , 1989 calculate that Indonesia's depletion-adjusted domestic product for the 1971-84 period was 4.0% in contrast to the official GDP estimate of 7.1%.
Yet even discounting the impact of resource depletion, these growth rates are very high compared to other developing countries, and the anomalous 1995-2000 stagnation was due to the To be sure, this is not a universally accepted view. Winters (2008) asserts that -Suharto is mistakenly seen as a father of development, when in fact he destroyed the country's foundation to move forward,‖ and that Suharto's corruption denied -Indonesia of some of the most golden decades, and its best opportunity to move from a poor to a middle class country.‖ In light of the facts that Indonesia's per capita income when Suharto came to power was around US$50 (still less than US$380 at today's prices), and Indonesia sustained seven percent growth over most of Suharto's regime, this assertion seems very far-fetched. However, it is important to keep in mind that corruption is seen in some quarters as a main feature of the Suharto era.
It is also important to note that although Indonesia had been mineral-resource-dependent in securing foreign reserves and central budget funds; it has never been especially mineralresource abundant or rich in any meaningful sense. Table 8 .2 provides comparisons among Indonesia, other Southeast Asian nations, and other countries that have been truly resource rich, resource dependent, or both. According to World Bank estimates, Indonesia's natural-resource assets in the mid-1990s
were equivalent to $7,000 per capita (in 1994 U.S. dollars), constituting 12% of total assets. Yet most of this wealth is in cropland, pastureland, and forests; sub-soil assets per capita were valued at only $670, or 3% of total assets. These are low compared to other hydrocarbon or mineral exporting nations: with Chile at $5,580 and 4%; Norway at $20,090 and 6.6%; Saudi Arabia at $67,910 and 39%; and Venezuela at $14,960 and 14% (Kunte et al. 1997) . Nor could one say that Indonesia's subsoil assets are large relative to Indonesia's per capita income: the ratios of subsoil-per-capita-asset-value to per capita GDP for many of the countries listed above are higher.
Even so, Indonesia had been dependent on oil and gas exports for government revenues.
In 1980/81, nearly 70% of government revenues (and 80% of foreign exchange earnings) came from these exports. Yet the rise in manufacturing and a much stronger domestic tax effort reduced the dependence on oil and gas revenues to the range of 20-25 percent of government revenues, and the net balance of foreign exchange from oil and gas is minimal.
Historically, some growth opportunities were wasted under the Suharto administration because of diversions of state-controlled resources into failed initiatives such as the Krakatau Steel Complex, the N-250 airplane, and the heavily-subsidized plywood industry. 3 These projects were demanded by -nationalist‖ factions within the government and Suharto's Golkar party, locked in a struggle with the -technocrats‖ within the government and business sectors, who supported orthodox economic policies.
In addition, natural-resource wealth that should have gone into the central treasury was diverted into private hands (e.g., logging concessions in state-owned forests charged a small fraction of the appropriate fees [Gillis 1988]) . Pertamina was heavily implicated in the nationalist project, financing the initiatives mentioned above, in addition to owning an airline and funding the armed forces (Bresnan 1993: 168-83; McDonald 1981: 157) , spending not only export revenues but also huge international loans. Following its 1975 bankruptcy, Pertamina was reformed (Royaards and Hui 1977: 37) ; its borrowing and investments required Bank of Indonesia approval and its governance came under inter-ministerial oversight to reduce the likelihood that any governmental actor could use Pertamina revenues to bypass the jurisdictions and awareness of other officials.
Although Pertamina was -tamed‖ for a while, the problems of non-transparency and corruption crept back. Arnold (2004: 2) reports that an audit of Pertamina books ordered by the International Monetary Fund for 1997 and 1998 -found that corruption and other ‗inefficiencies' cost Pertamina at least $4 billion.‖ This corruption was one factor leading to the conversion of Pertamina into a standard (though still fully government-owned) corporation, without regulatory authority, and the opening up of the oil and gas sectors directly to private corporations.
Overall, however, Indonesia prospered since the mid-1970s through a combination of liberalization reforms in trade and tax policy, openness to export and foreign investment, promotion of domestic savings, and very large volumes of foreign assistance. The inefficient and inequitable tax system was reformed in the 1980s, just in time to weather the decline in world oil prices (Gillis 1989: 91-105) . Non-oil domestic tax receipts in 1986-87 exceeded the revenues from oil-for the first time since 1974 (Gillis 1989: 82) . In addition, the contracting with foreign oil companies was revamped, enabling the government to capture more revenues.
The wasteful projects championed by the -nationalists‖ were also balanced by a rejection of protectionism to shelter industry. Under President Sukarno (1945-66), import-substitution industrialization had been attempted through multiple exchange rates and restrictive import licensing to shelter state enterprises and a wide range of small and large businesses (Hossain 2006: 29-30) . Given the shortage of skilled private-sector managers, many of the burgeoning state-sector companies were managed by army officers (Hossain 2006: 34) . Under Suharto, in contrast, a market-based strategy with a strong outward orientation was adopted with an -open door policy‖ for foreign investment. In 1968 the Suharto government also provided access of private domestic firms to the state banks, and eased the return of the flight capital of the SinoIndonesians (Hossain 2006: 40-44 ). Yet the state sector had access not only to the state banks, but also to various manipulations of off-budget revenues, as when the state aerospace industry received the funds from the so-called -Reforestation Fund‖ for financially questionable projects (Richardson 1996) .
The policy of neglecting or even draining resources from agriculture was replaced with policies to promote food production. With the opening up of foreign investment, the return of private investment, and huge foreign-assistance transfers (in 1970, Indonesia was the secondlargest recipient of official development assistance; it became the largest recipient in 1990), the need to raid capital from agriculture to finance manufacturing disappeared.
By the mid-1970s the fiascoes of Pertamina, Krakatau Steel and other misadventures strengthened the hand of technically sound officials to press economic orthodoxy even further. Agricultural promotion increased the incomes of the rural population, who were better able to pay for healthcare, school fees, and food.. Slowing the decline of agriculture in GDP made the overall economy and the government's budget less vulnerable to world oil price fluctuations. It also slowed the urbanization that has swamped social service efforts in many other countries.
Agriculture's share of GDP declined only slowly, with agricultural employment declining even more slowly (Hossain 2006: 26) .
The Indonesian government also largely contained inflation and profligate consumption by saving much of the windfall revenues abroad, resulting in a very impressive domestic savings rate of 30% by 1980, which has been maintained roughly at that level to the present, and adopting a balanced-budget commitment (Hossain 2006: 40 The feasibility of a balanced budget was also strongly reinforced by massive foreign assistance prompted by Suharto's strong disavowal of Sukarno's anti-Western economic and political stances.
Bappenas played the key gatekeeper role to discipline spending. Rudner (1976: 255) notes that Bappenas -was responsible for getting annual departmental budgetary proposals, and, Clearly, Indonesia has not made the -big push‖ to expand healthcare inputs, lagging behind other Asian countries, even discounting possible exaggeration in the statistics of other nations. 
D. Governmental Strategies to Channel Resource Wealth to Social Services
The Indonesian central government has used all of the channels displayed in Figure 
Growth of Social Service Expenditures. Social service spending has grown impressively
in education and health care (Table 8 .5). At constant prices, both education and health spending more than doubled from 2001 to 2009.. These increases outstrip the overall growth in spending of roughly one third, which was greatly moderated by the reduction in debt service. Government spending in agriculture also increased impressively. The government restructuring created major increases in administrative spending. The major swings in subsidies largely reflect fuel pricing, influenced by the world price and the government's willingness to reduce the subsidies. Table 8 .6 demonstrates, districts had spent up to twice as much on education as the central government, even though the central government dominates higher education funding, and both dwarf provincial spending. The major educational contribution the central government can make is in teacher training, in that the very high primary enrollments rate and rising secondary enrollment rate leave the quality of education as the major remaining challenge. Except at the tertiary level, the central government's spending has been largely devoted to -development‖, focusing largely to social assistance and secondarily to capital spending (World Bank 2007e: 33) . Nevertheless, the central government's share of education spending has increased, perhaps a harbinger of re-centralization. Nearly half of health care spending is allocated by the district governments, and more than half of government administration is as well. The central and district governments have far more control over the provincial governments. For these sectors, there is no indication of a recentralization.
Impact of Decentralization. As

E. Challenges to Converting Hydrocarbon Wealth into Social Programmes: A "Leakage" Model
Although Indonesia's per capita income growth per se has contributed greatly to the capacity of its citizens to secure social services, the government's direct role remains very important. In resource-dependent countries, this role can be undermined by a number of problems; Indonesia has wrestled with many of them. This section explores these problems through a taxonomy of the potential leakages of resources coming from hydrocarbon exports that could be channeled to social programmes. To be as comprehensive as possible, the analysis uses a functional framework that separates out the phases of resource exploitation, its conversion into revenues, and its channeling to the provision and use of social services. It should be noted that this taxonomy does not imply that the Indonesian policies are deficient in each respect, but rather that the Indonesian case is helpful in elaborating the potential pitfalls in channeling resource wealth into social programmes. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that complex tradeoffs are involved in designing the nature and coverage of social programmes, often requiring contested decisions to extend benefits to the less needy in order to meet the state's general obligations to the public good and to ensure the political sustainability of the programmes. Thus what constitutes -excessive‖ diversion of benefits to the less needy is unavoidably controversial.. Of these nine aspects of the exploitation of hydrocarbons and the flows to or away from income and services for the poor, the first four involve actions by the resource-producing companies, but government policies and oversight are involved in every stage. The last five are more exclusively in the hands of government policymakers. Each of these stages or flows is potentially vulnerable to one or more problems seen in a number of resource-exporting countries (Auty 1990; 2001; Ascher 1999) . It is important to keep in mind that the possibility of leakage does not mean that a transfer is, on balance, counterproductive.
The following analysis assesses the risks facing Indonesia:
1a. Under-investment in E&P. Pursuing the optimal time path of resource extraction and sale requires adequate investment and operation to take advantage of world prices when they are high. International investment in Indonesian hydrocarbons has been a problem because of fears of government policy changes, risks of contract reneging, and political disruption. The timing of extraction has sometimes been disrupted by delays in contracting with international resource companies to export when world prices are high. Especially when both Pertamina and the Indonesian government were involved in negotiating with international resource companies over oil E&P concessions, the confrontations and other sources of delay left Indonesia with far less production capacity just when world oil prices were rising to very advantageous export opportunities (Arnold 2004) . Some of these conflicts have now been resolved, especially regarding the key Exxon fields, possibly because of the demotion of Pertamina as a party in these negotiations. Yet the possibility of impasses arising in the future is still present. Furthermore, the decentralization to the provincial governments has complicated the negotiation. Arnold (2004: 2) notes that this decentralization -added a whole new and unpredictable layer to investment negotiations.‖ 1b. Greater international company revenue capture due to high risk cushion. Because of these risks, international resource companies add a risk cushion in their bidding on Indonesian concessions. This problem is also likely to diminish with the demotion of Pertamina. However, the 2001 decision to give production rights to Pertamina and a provincial government for a field long operated by Caltex overturned a long-standing convention of renewing lease-holders' access (Arnold 2004:2) . This has raised concerns that nationalism and politically-motivated decisions still call for a high risk cushion. As long as all international companies face similar risks, even a completely competitive bidding process cannot eliminate the cushion, which will result in lower initial exploration fees and higher production shares for the companies. 2b. Community opposition to exploration and/or production. Some current or prospective regions for hydrocarbon or hard-mineral extraction face the risk of community opposition, due to both environmental concerns and disputes over the distribution of gains.
Chevron, Indonesia's leading producer, has experienced arson against its vehicles and wells (Arnold 2004: 3) . In this respect, the fiscal decentralization may have a salutary effect. It should also be noted that raising vehicle-fuel prices has an additional environmental benefit of dampening the polluting effects of hydrocarbon burning both by discouraging travel and by encouraging the retirement of older, less efficient and more polluting vehicles. The
Indonesian government has invoked the problems of pollution and traffic congestion to justify travel-limiting measures, yet pricing is still likely to have the greatest conservation impact.
Corruption in the transfer to the central treasury.
The IMF-ordered audit demonstrating high levels of Pertamina corruption demonstrated that the earlier oversight structures were not sufficient to prevent corruption. Even with Pertamina now transformed into a standard corporation, and oversight largely transferred to the new regulatory agency PBMIGAS, many questions remain. Will Pertamina still play a larger role than a private corporation; will the government's anti-corruption efforts and the replacement of key Pertamina officials be effective; will PBMigas itself escape corruption; will the remaining ambiguities in the Pertamina and PB Migas roles leave room for both to be vulnerable to corruption?
5a. Lower income opportunities due to growth-suppressing macroeconomic policies
Indonesia's excellent contemporary record in avoiding the resource curse is largely due to the high caliber of the economic-policy units within the government, particularly the Finance Ministry and the planning agency BAPPENAS. These institutions have often won in the bureaucratic political battles with spending ministries. However, the usefulness of having competent economic-management institutions depends on whether the top political leaders allow these institutions to manage the macroeconomic parameters.
5b. Lower income opportunities due to poor investments. As we have seen, under Suharto a mix of unsound and sound projects were undertaken through central treasury financing or through the state enterprises. The exacerbating problem of unsound projects is that because they are typically selected because they are high profile, they tend to be very large and long term, making it difficult to determine that the resources are being wasted and often even more difficult to terminate the projects even after they are known to be unsound (as the Krakatau Steel and the N-250 airplane initiatives demonstrate). Probably the most important improvement in allocative efficiency in combating poverty has been achieved through the decentralization initiative, insofar as it has placed more resources in the hands of provincial and district governments in the lower-income regions of Indonesia.
The fiscal decentralization formula incorporated a -balancing fund‖ that favored the poorest areas as well as the oil-and gas-rich areas (World Bank 2007e: 113 ). Yet while the decentralization initiative provided the opportunity to incorporate a redistributive mechanism, this could have been accomplished without decentralizing if the central government had changed the formula guiding the allocation of centrally-provided resources.
13
6b. Sub-national corruption. In principle, with both national and sub-national officials involved in the decentralization and disbursement of decentralized fiscal resources, there are more opportunities for corruption in the more complicated flow of decentralized resources. In the specific case of Indonesia, however, the rationales of the decentralization worked in an opposite direction. The decentralization was a vehicle for uprooting the Suharto political machine that presided over the various patterns of bribes, favoritism, and extortion. It has provided the new leaders the opportunity to set new norms and safeguards. Yet some of the same political 13 For example, Vietnam, still a highly centralized country at least in formal structure, uses allocative formulae that strongly favor more remote, lower-income provinces. See Litvack and Rondinelli 1999.
pressures to channel resources into political party machines remains 14 , and it also remains to be seen whether the lower-level corruption relevant to access to social services will re-emerge.
7a. Mis-targeting that fails to benefit the neediest. The application of eligibility criteria is vulnerable to inadvertent and deliberate biases that lead to leakages of benefits away from the most needy. It is impossible to specify criteria that are fully objective and monitorable to ensure that the criteria are applied as the policy intends. In addition, one of the rationales of decentralization is to empower sub-national governance, which implies that local officials take over accountability, and monitoring becomes more difficult when the decisionmakers do not report directly to national officials.
7b. Cutbacks due to fluctuations in export earnings.
Without a hydrocarbon revenue stabilization fund, Indonesian social-programme financing faces the risk that if socialprogramme financing levels are closely tied to hydrocarbon revenues, the fluctuations in those revenues will lead to shortfalls in the social programme financing when export prices decline.
There are several possible approaches to address this risk. One is to earmark a specified level of funding for social programmes, with appropriate adjustments for cost-of-living increases. The government has attempted to do this for 14 One particularly bleak assessment concludes:
During the New Order, Suharto, his family and his cronies effected state capture through the pervasive control of state and economy. In post-Suharto Indonesia, state capture has not disappeared but has evolved into multiple oligarchies with their ramifying networks of dependents…Meanwhile, state institutions remain dysfunctional, leading to public cynicism that such institutions continue to function not as impartial public bodies, but as agencies for the consolidation of elite power (Wee 2002: 4) Another approach is to stabilize government budgets through a hydrocarbons stabilization fund, akin to those of other hydrocarbon-or hard-mineral-exporting countries. These funds have had mixed success (Fasano 2000; Davis et al. 2003; Moreen 2006) . It is understandable that Indonesian governments, with flagging net hydrocarbon exports, did not embrace the stabilization fund approach since it became popular in the 1990s, and the success of such funds depends on government discipline to resist fund-raiding when under pressure to spend beyond the fund formula. Nevertheless, if Indonesian natural gas and coal exports experience a significant boom, a stabilization fund should be given serious consideration.
8a. Diversion of cash transfers to less needy recipients.
The same problem seen in targeting social services to the most needy can arise in targeting cash transfers. Are the criteria clear; is the information available to determine eligibility available; are officials willing and able to apply these criteria? However, in the poorest villages and neighborhoods of Indonesia, the income differentials are not so great that these decisions would be difficult. It is striking that the transfers of cash to 2 million out of perhaps 40 to 50 million families have not created an uproar..
Perhaps status issues have restrained the scramble for eligibility.
8b. Mis-spent family income. Direct cash transfers, despite some leakage to families that do not meet the low-income eligibility criterion, did increase the disposable income of poor Indonesians. However, the experience in many countries has shown that nutrition, health care, and education spending are often neglected, especially by male heads of household. It is not possible to gauge the magnitude of leakage to other spending in the Indonesian case, but international experience (Mexico, Turkey, and Brazil) shows that significant gains in health and education can be secured (Widianto 2007: 2) .
9a. Diversion of conditional cash transfers to less needy recipients. As with unconditional cash transfers, eligibility criteria may not be followed faithfully. An additional source of discretion on the part of decisionmakers is whether individual families are conforming to the conditions. On the other hand, interactions between these decisionmakers and recipients provide an opportunity to check on eligibility as well as compliance. Conditional cash transfer programmes at both the community and household levels must be monitored, at least on a selective basis, to determine how much diversion is occurring. Policymakers must decide whether to devote more resources to this administration, or to let noncompliers continue with their privilege. It is too early to determine the administrative costs and effectiveness of conditional cash transfers.
9c. Corruption in administering conditional cash transfers. The corruption risk of conditional cash transfers is also heightened by the addition of the level of decisionmakers determining whether compliance is sufficient to warrant continued eligibility. Efforts to provide transparency in how these decisions are made could reduce the scope for corruption, but the risk remains.
G. Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from Indonesia's experience and prospects, relevant for both Indonesia and other hydrocarbon-extracting countries.
1. Indonesia's status as a hydrocarbon exporting or importing nation depends more on policies and conditions for foreign investment than on the actual hydrocarbon asset base.
Indonesia could once again become a net exporter, depending on the level of business risk in Indonesia and the government's capacity to rein in domestic demand.
2. The Indonesian case demonstrates that solid macroeconomic management can largely overcome wasteful investments in terms of overall economic growth of a resource-reliant nation.
3. Although notorious for its corruption, Indonesia under Suharto developed impressively, in economic if not political terms, converting a significant portion of its subsoil assets into sustained economic growth. Indonesia under Suharto was a relatively rare case of a corrupt -developmentalist‖ state. Despite caveats, including massive foreign assistance and the possibility that Indonesia could have advanced even more, the Indonesian experience reveals a crucial difference between rent-seeking corruption leading to growth-suppressing macro policies (protectionism, over-valued exchange rates, distorted interest rates), and the corruption that gave the Suharto machine a cut of the profits of economic activities that were profitable because the macro-policy context was relatively sound. After initially flirting with import-substitution industrialization, Suharto, relying on strong economic management institutions, provided enough rewards to the business sector without having to protect it through the growth-suppressing policy distortions.
4. In the transition to dependence on oil imports, post-Suharto governments have had to wrestle with domestic demands for cheap fuel. What was a rather hidden opportunity cost of less oil to export has become a highly politically-charged challenge of reducing the hardship-and the potential for disruption-of fuel-price increases. The subsidies have been the major obstacle to freeing up fiscal resources for social services, infrastructure (including sanitation), transfers to sub-national governments, and other purposes.
5. Indonesia has made progress in addressing the potential leakages that can reduce the subsoil revenues available to promote greater social-service quality and affordability. From the -top‖ of the process (contracting, extraction, and sale) through the avoidance of growthsuppressing macro-policies, both the Suharto and post-Suharto governments have been quite successful. In the benefit flows -downstream‖ in the conversion of subsoil assets into social services, the importance of potential leakages in targeting remains to be seen.
6. Better management of hydrocarbon pricing policy, by reducing the domestic subsidies, has enabled the post-Suharto governments to finance greatly expanded social-service programmes. Impressive increases in social service spending have occurred over the decade.
Yet the funding of social services remains vulnerable because the central government still collects the bulk of taxes and royalties (although royalty sharing has begun to offset this dominance); and the central government is likely to remain vulnerable to pressures to subsidize fuel prices.
7. Better management of hydrocarbon pricing policy also enabled the post-Suharto reformers to strengthen district-level administration, the crucial institution for the bold decentralization initiative.
8. The Indonesian government, like governments in other countries engaging in cash transfers, has traded one risk-that families will mis-use the cash-for another-that conditional cash transfers will create more bureaucracy and opportunities for corruption. The adoption of conditional cash transfers illustrates the power of development agencies to disseminate development strategies. Conditional cash transfers also reflect a re-assertion of central control compared to unconditional transfers, possibly a step in the re-centralization of social services.
